Compute Long-Run Excess Returns
Since the discovery of the small firm effect (e.g., Reinganum (1981) , Keim (1983) ) and other long-term pricing abnormalities, such as overreaction (e.g., DeBondt and Thaler (1985) ), it has become more common in empirical finance to compute excess returns for periods of up to five years. More recently, research has found surprising excess returns after specific company announcements such as earnings reports (Bernard and Thomas (1989) ), IPOs (Ritter (1991) ), share repurchases (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) ), and dividend omissions (Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995) ). In these long-term event studies it is crucial for the experiment to begin on the exact date of the announcement. Thus, it is necessary to use the daily version of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) returns tape, and it is only natural for researchers to try to use this same tape as a source for benchmark returns.
The purpose of this paper simply is to issue a warning that compounding daily returns for the equal-weighted (EW) index can lead to biases that are surprisingly large. Of course, since the papers by Blume and Stambaugh (1983) and Roll (1983) , most financial economists (should) know that compounding the returns on any portfolio, other than the value-weighted (VW) index portfolio, induces an upward bias in long-term returns (see Blume and Stambaugh (1983, p. 404) ). However, a casual poll of empirical finance researchers suggests that only the most frequent users of these data sources have a good sense of how large the biases of this sort can be.
So, in the interest of preventing serious errors, we offer three tables that show the difference between returns taken from two CRSP sources, the daily returns tape and the monthly returns tape. We do so for both the equal-weighted and value-weighted indexes. Although no bias is expected in the value-weighted index, we include these in the tables as a basis for comparison and as a check on our methods; however, these results are not discussed at any length. Section I of the paper explains the calculation of compound returns. Because the differences between the compounded daily returns and the monthly returns are so large for the equal-weighted index-larger than most researchers would guess-in Section II we investigate how much of the difference can be explained by the factors highlighted by Blume and Stambaugh (1983) and Roll (1983) , e.g., daily autocorrelations and bid-ask bounces. We find that about half of the monthly variation in this difference can be explained by such factors, though not always in the direction predicted by the theory. Section III concludes the article with several suggestions on how to use an equal-weighted index without introducing unnecessary bias.
I. Calculating Monthly Returns Using the Monthly and the Daily Indices
In Table I we calculate the monthly returns on the two indices in two ways. Either we compute the monthly return on the index by compounding the daily observations, or we report the monthly return from the tape. Calculating the monthly return from a daily index (either equal-weighted or value-weighted) can be written as follows:
(1)
where , is the monthly return calculated from the daily index, , , is the CRSP daily index, which we calculate as (1 Σ ⁄ )Σ =1,…, , where is the daily return for security , for holding period . For the EW index, equals one for all securities, and for the VW index is the market value of the firm's equity. Using the CRSP monthly index is equivalent to calculating returns as follows:
(2)
where, , is the CRSP monthly index. What is really surprising, however, is the magnitude of the difference (reported in column
(3) of Table I ). The average difference in annual returns is 6.04 percent, or about 0.427 percent per month. 1 This difference is large, especially compared to a typical monthly return. In some years the difference is much greater. For example, in 1991, the annual return using the daily series is 62.9 percent, but the return using the monthly series is 42.13 percent, a difference of over 20 percent, or more than 1.2 percent on a monthly basis. This difference is large enough to reverse the conclusions of a paper using this benchmark to compute excess returns. 2 1 The average annual difference is calculated as the difference between the buy-and-hold portfolios based on these indices as reported in the last row of Table I , columns (1) and (2): 1.01794 12 -1.012924 12 = 0.0604. Because of Jensen's inequality, this is not equal to the compounded monthly difference (1.04269 12 -1), which equals 5.25 percent on an annual basis. 2 We can consider the comparison between the daily and monthly indices to be the same as the comparison of the one-month buy-and-hold strategy (the monthly index) to a daily rebalancing (the daily index), as described in Roll (1983) and in Blume and Stambaugh (1983) . Thus, the fact that the daily index yields higher annual returns in every year of our sample period is a strong indication of negative daily serial dependence of securities' returns and positive serial dependence of the portfolio's returns.
As Table II shows, the difference between the compounded daily returns and the monthly returns for the EW index is not constant across months. The largest difference, 0.66 percent, is in the month of December. 3
In Table III , we report the months with the largest differences between the indices. The largest difference is 2.63 percent in July 1992. All the differences reported in this table are more than 1 percent per month. Surprisingly, only one January (1991) Finally, in Table IV, 
II. Explaining the Differences Between the Daily and Monthly Indices
What can explain the large and fluctuating differences between the daily and monthly equal-weighted index (hereafter referred to as Diff)? The papers by Blume and Stambaugh (1983) and Roll (1983) suggest that intertemporal dependencies in returns, including those produced by bid-ask bounce and non-synchronous trading, should be important related factors.
Much of the autocorrelation in individual stock returns can be attributed to the bid-ask bounce and the short-term autocorrelation in the index to non-synchronous trading (e.g., Roll (1983 ), Lo and MacKinlay (1988 , 1990 ). Thus, we measure these factors directly. Borrowing from Blume and Stambaugh, for each security and for the portfolio as a whole, we proxy for the returns variation that is due to the bid-ask bounce by the variation of the excess return relative to price.
The average turnover is another natural proxy for the bid-ask bounce and the effect of non-synchronous trading. Higher turnover is likely to be associated with lower non-synchronous trading and lower bid-ask bounce. This, in turn, should reduce the bias in the daily return. Table V reports the mean, standard deviation, and the extreme values of each of the variables we use. We have already discussed the first two variables ( and the compounded daily index, , ). The third variable is the cross-sectional variance in returns, Var( � ) . We calculate each security's average return for any given month, and then find the cross-sectional variance of those returns. The next three variables, 1 ����, 2 ����, 3 ����, are the first-, second-, and thirdorder average autocorrelations, respectively. Each security's autocorrelation for month is calculated from daily returns and averaged cross-sectionally. 5 As expected, the average daily autocorrelation is negative and similar in magnitude to that reported by Lo and MacKinlay (1990) . We also calculate the first-, second-, and third-order autocorrelations of the equalweighted portfolio, 1 , 2 . 3 . Consistent with prior literature, the first-order portfolio autocorrelation is, on average, positive. The second-and third-order autocorrelations are negative, but much smaller. The average daily turnover of the securities in our sample, ����� , is calculated as the daily average turnover for each security in a given month, and then averaged across securities. Its mean value of 0.19 percent implies an annual turnover of approximately 49 percent. Even in frictionless markets where returns are temporally independent, the cross-section variation in returns will affect the difference (see Roll (1983) ). Thus, the last two variables are the crosssectional average of the variation of excess return to price ratio, ( ⁄ ) �������������� and the variation of the portfolio excess return relative to its price, ( ⁄ ) ��������������������� . (Note: To calculate the portfolio variance, we calculate the ratio of excess return to price in each day in a month. We then calculate the variance of this series.) Both the standard deviation and the extreme values of all these variables indicate that their time-series variations are not trivial.
In Table VI we present the results of several regressions that are based on the variables described above. In all the regressions, the dependent variable is , the difference between the monthly index compounded from the equal-weighted daily index, and the equal-weighted monthly index return. In the REG 1 column, we present the regression results based on the autocorrelation measures. The average first-order autocorrelation coefficient is negative (-0.03) and highly significant ( = 6.07). Thus, as the average autocorrelation of individual securities becomes more negative, the difference between the daily and the monthly indices increases.
Similarly, the portfolio autocorrelation coefficient indicates that as the portfolio autocorrelation becomes more positive, the difference between the daily and the monthly indices increases. In both cases, the second-order autocorrelation coefficients take the opposite sign, but they are insignificantly different from zero. The third-order autocorrelations for the securities and for the portfolio are negative and positive, respectively. Both are significant. The cross-sectional variation is positive and significant (the simple univariate correlation is also positive). Thus, higher cross-sectional variability in stocks' returns results in a higher bias. It should be noted that the sign of this coefficient is the opposite of what the theory indicates (Roll (1983) ). It is possible that this variable captures some deviation from the standard assumptions (normality and independence). 6
It is interesting to compare the relative effect of the portfolio positive autocorrelation to the average negative autocorrelation of the individual securities on . The mean portfolio autocorrelation is 20.22 percent, and the mean securities' autocorrelation is −6.255 percent.
However, their coefficients are 0.0035 and −0.032, respectively. Thus, the securities'
autocorrelation has an effect that is more than two-and-one-half times larger than the portfolio autocorrelation effect. In other words, if most of the portfolio's autocorrelation can be attributed to non-synchronous trading, but the securities autocorrelation is a result of a bid-ask bounce, then the bid-ask bounce has a larger effect on the difference than non-synchronous trading. 7
In the next set of regressions, we try alternative measures of bid-ask bounces and nonsynchronous trading. In particular, the average variation of the excess return to price measures the effect of the bid-ask bounce on individual securities, and the portfolio's variation of its excess return to price measures the effect on the index. REG 2 presents this result. The first thing we notice is that using a more direct measure of the bid-ask effect significantly increases the regression's 2 (from approximately 22 percent when the autocorrelation is used to 47 percent here). Second, both coefficients are positive and highly significant. Third, the coefficient of the portfolio variation of excess return to price is positive and highly significant-the opposite of what we expected (see Blume and Stambaugh (1983) ). In the REG 3 column, we add the firstorder autocorrelation terms, respectively. All coefficients are significant and their sign is consistent with prior analysis. The 2 increases to almost 50 percent. As before, adding higherorder autocorrelation terms does not add much to the regression's explanatory power.
Another interesting variable is turnover. Higher turnover should result in a lower bid-ask bounce effect, and the non-synchronous trading problem should be less pronounced. Both effects should lead to a negative association between turnover and the difference. Higher turnover should result in a lower difference. Although the turnover coefficient is indeed negative, it is insignificant (reported in REG 4).
In summary, the difference between the daily and the monthly indices is larger in months where the index's return variation is higher, when the autocorrelation in the index returns is higher, when the cross-sectional variability in returns is higher, and when the average autocorrelation in individual returns is lower. Neither turnover nor dividends significantly affect the magnitude of the bias.
Finally, a natural question about our results is whether the bias we report holds for portfolios of other sizes. For example, does the size of the bias depend on the number of stocks in the portfolio? We conduct a Monte Carlo analysis to evaluate whether the number of securities in an equal-weighted portfolio affects the difference between the compounded daily returns and monthly returns of the portfolio. We generate five sizes of equal-weighted portfolios of 10, 100, 300, 600, and 900 randomly selected securities from CRSP and compute the difference between the annualized compounded daily returns and the annualized monthly returns by portfolio for each month over the 1964-1993 period. This results in 360 runs for each of the five portfolio size groups-30 years and 12 months per year. For example, for the 10-security portfolio groups, we randomly select ten companies that are publicly traded in January 1964 and then compute the difference between the annualized compounded daily return and annualized monthly return for this month. We then repeat this entire procedure for each month over the sample period. That is, we randomly select ten more securities that are publicly traded in February 1964 and compute the difference, and so on through the entire sample period. We repeat this process for each portfolio size group. We then compute the average difference (and the standard error of the average difference) across the 360 runs for each of the five portfolio size groups. The difference (on an annual basis) is 6.51 percent for the 10-stock portfolio, 7.12 percent for the 100-stock portfolio, 7.23 percent for the 300-stock portfolio, 7.19 percent for the 600-stock portfolio, and 7.18 percent for the 900-stock portfolio. These results indicate that (1) a significant bias exists even for a portfolio of ten stocks, and (2) the bias has the same magnitude for all the portfolios we check. (It should also be noted that using daily returns to calculate a portfolio long-run return will result in a bias even if this portfolio is not being used as the benchmark portfolio. Thus this problem will affect event studies that compute daily returns on any equally-weighted portfolios in event time, regardless of the benchmark that is being used.)
III. Conclusions
The differences between the monthly returns compounded from the daily tapes and the Several strategies are available to avoid the problems highlighted here. The first is to use the value-weighted index as the benchmark portfolio. This portfolio does not suffer from any compounding related bias. A second alternative is to use the monthly equal-weighted index instead of the daily. However, if an equal-weighted return series is needed for any long period of time, then it is necessary to splice the monthly and daily tapes together. For example, if a one-
year return is needed from November 11, 1991, then the daily tape should be used to compute the returns for the remaining trading days in November 1991. This return is then added to the return for the next 11 months, using the monthly tape. Finally, the daily tape is used again for the first part of November 1992. This procedure reduces the bias substantially. Using the monthly instead of the daily equal-weighted index (the second alternative) results in a much smaller bias.
In fact, the difference between a yearly buy-and-hold strategy and a monthly rebalancing strategy is very small (see Roll (1983) ). 8 A third alternative is to follow the approach of Roll (1983) , Blume and Stambaugh (1983) , Conrad and Kaul (1993) , and others, and compute the buy-andhold return for the benchmark portfolio. Because the benchmark portfolio in the case discussed here is the CRSP equal-weighted index, we can calculate buy-and-hold returns by using the average price of the portfolio at the beginning and then at the end of the holding period (with dividends reinvested).
Clearly, the third alternative is the best: It produces an exact buy-and-hold portfolio that is clear of any biases. Further, this alternative does not restrict the researcher in the type of a benchmark portfolio that can be used-even if the index is not value-weighted, it will not result in a bias.
Until several years ago, this alternative was associated with a non-trivial cost. We had to construct such an index from scratch. 9 However, CRSP now provides a daily price index (dividends included) for both the equal-weighted portfolio and for the ten size-decile portfolios.
This index can be used to address this issue quite easily: we can simply retrieve the index level for the first day and for the last day to be included in the excess return calculation and then use these two numbers to calculate the appropriate buy-and-hold return on the benchmark portfolio.
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